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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MARCO VILLALOBOS 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 981795-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether defendant's rights under the Utah and United States Constitutions 
were violated because the prosecution recommended prison for the defendant and jail 
for the co-defendants as a means of punishing the defendant for exercising his right to 
remain silent and his right of association. Because the sentence is being challenged, the 
standard of review is abuse of discretion. State v. Houk, 906 P.2d 907, 909 
(Utah.Ct. App. 1995). "Abuse of discretion may be manifest if the actions of the judge 
in sentencing were 'inherently unfair' or if the judge imposed a 'clearly excessive 
sentence.' ' " Houk, 906 P.2d at 909. The issue was preserved for appeal below 
because it was briefed and raised in oral arguments. R. 256; R. 340, p. 42 
2. Whether the defendant's rights were violated because the judge failed to 
correct mistakes in the presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing. 
Preserved below by argument made at the time of sentencing. R. 341, p. 7-9. Although 
the Court has not stated a standard of review on this particular issue, the standard of 
review should be clearly erroneous for factual determinations and correctness for legal 
determinations. State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979 (Utah App. 1992). 
3. Whether the defendant was rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance of 
counsel by his attorney's failure to request a cautionary jury instruction regarding the 
inherently unreliable and not credible testimony proffered by co-defendants stating that 
Villalobos was involved in the alleged crime, especially in light of the State's 
preferential treatment of the co-defendants upon condition that they implicate the 
defendant. "To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant 
must show that his counsel rendered a deficient performance that fell below and 
objective standard of reasonable conduct and that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defendant." Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 221 (Utah 1993). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const. Amend. I 
U.S. Const. Amend XIV. 
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Utah Const. Art. I §7 
U.C.A. §77-18-l(6)(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Marco Villalobos appeals from the sentence and commitment imposed by the 
Honorable Anthony W. Schofield after a jury trial where he was convicted of 
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, and Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a 
second degree felony. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Villalobos was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on or about 
January 26, 1998, with Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-6-302, and Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-408 (R. 1-2). In addition, the State 
sought a group crime enhancement pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-203.1 
(Id.). On February 19, 1998, a preliminary hearing was held and Villalobos was 
bound-over for arraignment (R. 17-18, 26). 
On March 25, 1998, Villalobos filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence on grounds 
of an illegal, non-consensual search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution (R. 28-38). Villalobos also 
3 
filed a motion to suppress incriminating statements made by a co-defendant (R. 39-48). 
After a hearing, the trial court denied Villalobos' motions (R. 65, 342). 
On July 13-14, 1998, a jury trial was held in this matter with Judge Schofield 
presiding (R. 226-30, 338, 339). A co-defendant, Richard Houston was tried in the 
same proceedings. During deliberation, the jury submitted a question concerning 
whether Steve Tiede or Ashley Cloward testified that they recognized Villalobos' voice 
(R. 224). After deliberation, the jury returned with a verdict of "guilty" as charged on 
both counts (R. 232). 
After trial but prior to sentencing, Villalobos filed a motion to declare the group 
crime enhancement statute unconstitutional (R. 250-276). After a hearing, the trial 
court denied Villalobos' motion (R. 314-16). At sentencing on October 26, 1998, 
however, the trial court did not impose the gang enhancement but sentenced Villalobos 
to concurrent terms of 5-life and 1-15 years in the Utah State Prison (R. 317-19). 
On November 25, 1998, Villalobos filed a notice of appeal with the Fourth 
District Court (R. 326). On April 1, 1999, the Utah Supreme Court transferred 
Villalobos' appeal to this Court and this action followed (R. 336). Villalobos made a 
motion pursuant to UTAH R. APP. P. 23B to remand the case back to the trial court for 
entry of findings of fact regarding claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which 
motion was granted on April 21, 2000 (R. 343). After an evidentiary hearing on that 
issue, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision wherein it found that Villalobos 
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was not prejudiced by the absence of an alibi witness during trial (R. 353-352). 
Defendant's motion to strike briefs, supplement the record and stay the briefing 
schedule was granted by this Court on October 25, 2000. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Testimony of Steven Tiede 
Steven Tiede testified that he resides in an apartment located above the garage at 
his parents house at 1949 North 85 West, Orem (R. 338 at 62-64). Early in the 
morning on January 16, 1998, he was in his apartment with three friends playing 
Nintendo (R. 338 at 64-65). Five individuals - three wearing ski masks - entered the 
apartment carrying pipes and boards (R. 338 at 65-66). The assailants informed Tiede 
and his friends that they had a gun which would be used if they did not cooperate (R. 
338 at 68). Tiede testified that one individual carried a 15-inch metal pipe or bar and 
another carried a piece of wood (R. 338 at 69). The assailaints ransacked his room 
and took personal property (R. 338 at 72). 
Tiede testified that one of the individuals wearing a ski mask was William 
Screws, who was later apprehended in the apartment (R. 338 at 69-70). Jeff Richman 
also wore a ski mask and carried the metal pipe (R. 338 at 70). The two individuals 
without masks stayed mostly by the door "just kind of observing" (R. 338 at 70-71). 
However, Tiede testified that one of the unmasked individuals took his wallet (R. 338 
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at 73). Tiede did not see or recognize either of the unmasked individuals in the 
courtroom (R. 338 at 75). 
Tiede testified that the individuals were in the room approximately two minutes 
before his mother yelled from the hallway (R. 338 at 73). Four of the assailants then 
fled the apartment and William Screws was apprehended (R. 338 at 74). 
B. Testimony of William Screws 
William Screws testified that he plead guilty to aggravated robbery and theft by 
receiving for an incident which occurred on January 16, 1998, in Orem in exchange for 
a sentencing recommendation from the State in favor of probation rather than a prison 
sentence (R. 338 at 79-80). In fact, Mr. Screws was sentenced to jail rather than 
prison. (R. 338 at 80). Screws testified that he committed the crimes with Jeff 
Richman, Rich Houston, Villalobos, and a guy named Mo (R. 338 at 81). 
Screws testified that on the evening of the 16th he was at Richman's house with 
Richman and Villalobos (R. 338 at 82). The three of them talked about going to a 
"guy's house and getting some bud [marijuana]" (R. 338 at 82-83). Screws testified 
that Villalobos and Richman left to look for a car while he waited at the house (R. 338 
at 83-84). Villalobos and Richman returned without a car so the three of them took 
some tools and walked about 12 blocks before they found a Saturn automobile which 
they took to Richman's house (R. 338 at 84-86). 
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The three then left Richman's house and went to "Adam's house" where they 
met up with Houston, Mo and Adam (R. 338 at 86). Screws testified that they 
informed the others of the stolen car and of the plan to break into a house and steal 
some marijuana (R. 338 at 87, 92). Then five of them then climbed into the vehicle, 
with Mo driving, and went over to the house (R. 338 at 87). Once at the house, they 
ran upstairs (R. 338 at 88). According to Screws, Mo and Houston did not want to 
wear masks but he, Villalobos and Richman did (R. 338 at 88-89, 111). Screws 
testified that Richman carried a pipe or bar in his hand (R. 338 at 110). 
Screws testified that at the top of the stairs, someone knocked on the door and 
then all five of them walked inside (R. 338 at 90). Screws testified that he could not 
remember whether there was in invitation to enter the apartment (R. 338 at 116). The 
five men started yelling and telling people to get on the ground and Screws pretended to 
hold a gun under a stocking cap (R. 338 at 90). Screws testified that he saw Houston 
tkke a Nintendo 64 from the apartment (R. 338 at 91). 
Screws testified that when they heard Tiede's mother knock on the door, the 
other four left the apartment but he was apprehended (R. 338 at 91-92). Upon being 
arrested, Screws informed the police that they had gone to Tiede's house because he 
owed him money (R. 338 at 102). Screws also told the police that he was not involved 
in stealing the car (R. 338 at 102-03). Screws testified that he lied to the police during 
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the initial interview but that his testimony at trial - after he had been offered a plea 
bargain and had been sentenced - was the truth (R. 338 at 105). 
C. Testimony of Jeff Richman 
Jeff Richman testified that he too plead guilty to aggravated robbery and 
possession of a stolen vehicle for the events of January 16, 1998 (R. 338 at 119). In 
return, Richman was given a reduced sentence (R. 338 at 146). In fact, Mr. Richman 
was given a suspended prison sentence and was placed on probation (R. 338 at 160). 
Richman testified that Screws was living with him on January 16, 1998 (R. 338 at 119) 
and that on that date, Richman, Screws and Villalobos discussed taking two pounds of 
marijuana from a "guy's" house (R. 338 at 121-23). Richman testified that they took a 
car they found about 4 blocks from his house (R. 338 at 123-24). Richman testified 
that he and Screws first went to find and take the car and then subsequently took 
Villalobos with them to ack as look-out while they actually took the car (R. 338 at 124-
26). 
The three of them drove it back to Richman's house and then drove to Brenda 
Savage's house, whose son Adam is a friend of Richman (R. 338 at 126-27). Richman 
testified that while they were at the Savage home, Adam arrived with Houston and Mo 
(R. 338 at 127-28). Richman testified that they were drinking Tequilla (R. 338 at 128). 
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Richman said they asked Houston and the others if they wanted to come take the 
marijuana with them (R. 338 at 129). Richman testified that he, Villalobos, Screws, 
Mo and Houston then left the house (R. 338 at 129). 
Richman testified that it took them ten minutes to get to the house and that when 
they arrived, they sat outside "for a bit" before moving towards the door (R. 338 at 
130). Richman, Screws and Villalobos put on ski masks (R. 338 at 132) and Richman 
carried a pipe or bar (R. 338 at 132-33) while Screws carried a piece of wood (R. 338 
at 134). Villalobos carried no weapon. 
Richman testified that someone knocked on the door and that someone from 
inside said "'come in', so we went in" (R. 338 at 135-36). Richman said that they saw 
"a bunch of people" sitting inside and that they asked them for some "weed" (R. 338 at 
136). Richman was holding the bar in his hands and he told the individuals inside to 
get on the ground and to give him their wallets (R. 338 at 137). Richman testified that 
during the ten minutes he was in the apartment he took wallets and looked for weed (R. 
338 at 138-39). 
Richman testified that when a girl screamed about being robbed, "we took off 
out of the house" and ran to the car (R. 338 at 140). Richman had wallets in his 
possession (Id.) and he dropped the bar on his way out the door (R. 338 at 142). Mo 
drove the car, while Richman rode in the passenger seat and Houston and Villalobos sat 
in the back seat (R. 338 at 141-42). They drove to Richman's house and dropped the 
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car off down the block (R. 338 at 142-43). Richman changed his clothes, went 
downstairs and hid (R. 338 at 143). 
D. Testimony of Mark Pulley 
Mark Pulley testified that on the evening of January 16, 1998, he was at Steve 
Tiede's residence with Steve and two others when a "bunch of dudes busted in and 
robbed the place" (R. 338 at 191). Five individuals entered the residence and that 
three of them were wearing masks (R. 338 at 194). Pulley testified that the individuals 
were carrying a 2x4 and a lead pipe and threatened to use a gun that was never 
displayed (R. 338 at 195). The individuals threatened them - especially Tiede - and 
that they took stuff from the apartment (R. 338 at 196-97). Approximately 3-4 minutes 
after entry, the individuals left when they heard Tiede's mother yell (R. 338 at 197). 
However, Screws was apprehended before he could leave (R. 338 at 197-98). 
E. Testimony of Larry Barton 
Larry Barton, the stepfather of Steve Tiede, testified that on January 16, 1998, 
there was a disturbance in Tiede's apartment/room which is adjacent to his home (R. 
338 at 211). Barton said that his wife first heard the disturbance and said "hey, they're 
here again" (R. 338 at 212). Barton said his wife left their room and he followed (R. 
338 at 213). Barton's wife was hit in the face by a pipe thrown by an individual in blue 
clothing and a ski mask (R. 338 at 213-14). Barton testified that he picked-up the pipe 
and chased at least two individuals down the steps (R. 338 at 214-16). Barton was 
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about to apprehend one individual wearing a mask when another yelled from the car, 
"just shoot him, take out your gun" (R. 338 at 216, 218). Barton testified that he 
stopped the chase and the individuals got in the car and left with the two masked 
individuals sitting in the rear (R. 338 at 216-17, 219) 
F. Testimony of Jolene Young 
Jolene Young testified that she lived in Orem in January of 1998 (R. 338 at 
232). On January 15-16, 1998, her plum colored Saturn automobile was taken from 
her drive-way (R. 338 at 233, 238). Young discovered it was missing when she 
received a call asking if she had allowed someone to borrow the car (R. 338 at 238). 
G. Testimony of Ashley Cloward 
Ashley Cloward testified that she was at Steve Tiede's residence on January 16, 
1998, with Tiede, Pulley and another individual (R. 338 at 241). Cloward said that 
they were playing Nintendo at approximately 2-3 a.m. when a "bunch of guys" opened 
the door (R. 338 at 242). Three of the men wore masks and two did not (R. 338 at 
243-44). The individuals told them to lie on the floor (R. 338 at 245). Cloward 
testified that she recognized Screws as one of the individuals in a mask and that he 
pretended to have a gun (R. 338 at 245). Cloward said that one individual stood over 
Tiede with a pipe and threatened him (R. 338 at 246). Cloward testified that someone 
in a mask - other than Screws - took the Nintendo, and that two amps, her pager and 
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keys were also taken (R. 338 at 246). When Tiede's mother came to the door, the 
individuals fled (R. 338 at 247). Tiede's mother tackled an individual wearing a mask 
and retrieved a boom box while his stepfather chased another masked individual (R. 
338 at 247-48). Cloward testified that four individuals - two that were masked and two 
that were not - got in the car and left but not before she got the license plate number 
(R. 338 at 249-50). 
H. Testimony of Richard Houston 
Richard Houston testified that early in the morning on January 16, 1998, he was 
at Adam Heaton's house with Mo when Richman, Screws and Villalobos came over (R. 
339 at 13-14). Houston testified that Richman asked him if he wanted to go get some 
marijuana from this "guy" who had some (R. 339 at 14-15). Houston said there was 
no talk of a robbery or break-in or of a stolen car (R. 339 at 15). Houston said that he 
agreed to the proposition and left with Richman and Mo (R. 339 at 15). Houston could 
not remember if Screws was with them because he was drunk (R. 339 at 15-16). 
Houston recognized the house they went to because he had been there a couple of 
months previous to use the phone (R. 339 at 16). Houston testified that there was no 
conversation in the car about robbery or hurting anyone, etc. (R. 339 at 17). Houston 
testified that he saw a mask or cap in Richman's pocket (R. 339 at 17-18). 
Houston testified that when they arrived at the house, they all got out of the car 
(R. 339 at 18). Houston testified that he stood by the car and then went to use the 
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bathroom while the others went inside (R. 339 at 18-19). Houston believed that they 
were at the house to get some marijuana (R. 339 at 19). Houston testified that Mo, 
too, remained outside (R. 339 at 19). Houston testified that he and Mo then heard 
people yelling inside so they went upstairs to see what was going on (R. 339 at 19-20). 
When they reached the top of the stairs, Houston testified that he "saw people on the 
ground and people coming running out" (R. 339 at 20). When Houston saw this, he 
returned to the back seat of the car with Mo right behind him (R. 339 at 20-21). The 
others soon returned to the car and they left (R. 339 at 23). 
Houston testified that he did not know if Villalobos was with them at the house 
but that he was at Richman's house afterwards when the police came and they were 
arrested (R. 339 at 37). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Richman and Screws were admittedly the ring leaders during this incident 
and were the only assailants to carry weapons. While the evidence suggests that 
Houston and Villalobos might have participated, the evidence is also clear that they did 
not instigate the incident, nor did they carry weapons or directly threaten or harm the 
victims. 
At the time of arrest, Richman and Screws confessed to the police and made 
their confessions on video tape. The prosecutor offered to drop the group crime 
penalty enhancement and recommend probation if Richman and Screws plead guilty as 
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charged and testified at court. No plea bargain was offered to Villalobos because the 
prosecutor believed Villalobos was in a gang and because he did not confess at the 
time of his arrest. 
While a prosecutor has discretion in making plea agreements, a prosecutor may 
not punish a defendant for exercising a constitutional right. In this case, the prosecutor 
did punish Villalobos for exercising his right to remain silent. Although less culpable 
than his co-defendants, Villalobos has been sentenced to spend several years in prison 
for choosing to remain silent while his co-defendants who admitted to instigating the 
incident and being guilty of more serious crimes are on probation. Further, the 
prosecutor violated Villalobos' right to freely associate by refusing him a plea bargain 
because he believed he was in a gang. Because the prosecutor exercised his discretion 
in such a way as to violate Villalobos' constitutional rights, the trial court should have 
sentenced Villalobos as the co-defendants. In other words, Villalobos should have been 
given probation. 
II. At the time of sentencing, the defendant pointed out numerous errors in his 
presentence investigation report. The trial judge never addressed the errors on the 
record. Therefore, the case should be remanded so that the trial court can properly 
address the errors on the presentence investigation report. 
III. Villalobos' trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request 
a cautionary jury instruction regarding the unreliable nature of testimony from co-
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defendants implicating the defendant. The outcome of this case hinged upon 
credibility. The co-defendants in this case had obviously selfish motives to testify 
against Villalobos and thus a clear conflict of interest. Their testimony was unduly 
prejudicial to Villalobos, unreliable, and not credible. Nonetheless, it was the only 
evidence implicating Villalobos because no one else could identify him or place him at 
the scene of the alleged incident. Villalobos' attorney failed to protect Villalobos' right 
to a fair trial when he neglected to have the jury instructed accordingly. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BY 
THE PROSECUTOR'S FAILURE TO OFFER THE DEFENDANT THE PLEA 
BARGAIN OFFERED TO THE CO-DEFENDANTS 
The State originally charged four adults in this crime, Mr. Richman, Mr. 
Houston, Mr. Villalobos and Mr. Screws. The State then offered plea bargains to Mr. 
Richman and Mr. Screws. The plea bargain was that if they plead guilty to the crimes 
as charged and would testify at the trial, the State would not seek the group crime 
penalty enhancement and would recommend probation. Screws and Richman did plead 
guilty, they did testify, the group crime penalty enhancement was not imposed and they 
were placed on probation. 
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Both the Utah Constitution and the United States Constitution demand that 
"persons similarly situated should be treated similarly... /" Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 
669 (Utah 1984). Moreover, "[bjasic principles of equal protection of the law are inherent 
in the very concept of justice and are a necessary attribute of a just society." Malan, 693 
P.2d at 670. In a concurring opinion to Railway Express Agency Inc. v. New York, 336 
U.S. 106, 113 (1949), Justice Robert Jackson stated: "Courts can take no better measure 
to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in operation." In this 
case, that did not occur. 
A careful review of the facts shows that Mr. Richman and Mr. Screws carried 
weapons. While there was some evidence that a third weapon was involved, there was no 
evidence to the effect that Mr. Villalobos carried the third weapon. The evidence further 
showed that Mr. Richman and Mr. Screws were the ring leaders in the crime and that Mr. 
Villalobos participated on a more passive basis. 
The prosecutor chose to offer plea bargains to Mr. Richman and Mr. Screws, 
instead of to Mr. Villalobos and Mr. Houston. The prosecutor's reason for doing so is 
stated in a letter he sent to defense counsel and filed with the court. R. 252. The letter 
explains that the prosecutor treated the defendants differently because Mr. Richman and 
Mr. Screws gave full video-taped confessions to the police at the time of their arrest. 
Because Mr. Villalobos did not give a confession to the police, he was not offered a 
plea bargain. Further, because the prosecutor believed Mr. Villalobos was in a gang, 
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he did not offer a plea bargain. At the time of sentencing, however, the trial judge 
questioned that statement because the co-defendants were in a gang but were offered 
plea agreements. R. 340, p. 45. 
In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), a defendant was convicted and 
sentenced to a prison term. After winning his appeal and after being convicted again, the 
defendant was sentenced to a more lengthy prison term. The Supreme Court held that his 
second sentence violated his due process rights because he was being punished for 
exercising his right to an appeal. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes. 434 U.S. 357 (1978), a 
prosecutor told a criminal defendant that if the defendant did not accept a plea bargain, 
the prosecutor would indict him on more serious charges. The Supreme Court held that 
such conduct was not a violation of the defendant's due process rights. In so ruling, 
however, the Court was careful to state that prosecutors did not have unfettered 
discretion. The Court stated, "[t]hough to punish a person because he has done what the 
law allows violates due process, there is no such element of punishment in the "give-and-
take" of plea bargaining as long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecutor's 
offer." Bordenkircher at 357 (citation omitted). The Court went on to state, "[t]here is no 
doubt that the breadth of discretion that our country's legal system vests in prosecuting 
attorneys carries with it the potential for both individual and institutional abuse. And 
broad though that discretion may be, there are undoubtedly constitutional limits upon its 
exercise." Bordenkircher at 364. The Supreme Court explained the differences between 
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the Pearce and the Bordenkircher cases. The Court pointed out that in Bordenkircher, the 
prosecutor was attempting to discourage the defendant from exercising his constitutional 
rights in the future. In Pearce, on the other hand, the defendant was being penalized for 
exercising his constitutional rights in the past. Bordenkircher at 362-63. 
In this case, Mr. Villalobos is being punished for exercising past constitutional 
rights. In his letter, the prosecuting attorney explained that Mr. Villalobos was singled 
out from the co-defendants because he refused to give a video confession or otherwise 
cooperate with the police at the time of his arrest. In other words, because Mr. Villalobos 
exercised his right to remain silent, he was not offered a plea bargain. Similarly, the 
prosecutor refused to offer a plea bargain to Mr. Villalobos because he was a "known" 
gang member. In other words, since the prosecutor believed that Mr. Villalobos had 
associated with street gang members, Mr. Villalobos was not offered a plea bargain. 
Strangely, however, the co-defendants who were also allegedly in the same street gang 
were offered plea bargains. By punishing Mr. Villalobos for exercising those rights, Mr. 
Villalobos' constitutional rights have been violated. 
In order to remedy that wrong, this Court should reverse the sentence imposed by 
the trial court and remand the case with instructions that Mr. Villalobos be resentenced as 
though the prosecutor recommended probation and does not seek the group crime 
enhancement. 
POINT II 
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THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD HAVE MADE CORRECTIONS TO THE 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE RECORD 
At the time of sentencing, the defendant pointed out several errors in the 
presentence investigation report to the judge. R. 341, p. 7. The errors are as follows: (a) 
the report inaccurately stated that Mr. Villalobos stole an automobile as part of this crime, 
R 341, p. 8; (b) the report inaccurately stated that $3,000 in computer equipment had been 
stolen, R. 341, p. 8; (c) the report failed to list all of the jobs which the defendant had 
held, R. 341, p. 8; (d) the report innacurately stated that Mr. Villalobos had carried a 
weapon during the commission of the crime, R. 341, p. 9 The trial court failed to address 
any of the inaccuracies on the record. 
In State v. Jaeger, 973 P.2d 404 (Utah 1999), the defendant claimed inaccuracies 
in the presentence investigation report. This Court held that the trial court was required to 
either grant a ten day extension or correct the inaccuracies on the record. The reasoning 
of the court was simply that U.C.A. §77-18-l(6)(a) requires the trial court to do so. The 
procedure is important to criminal defendants because even if the judge does not sentence 
the defendant based upon the inaccuracies in the report, those inaccuracies will follow the 
defendant to prison and to the board of pardons. This Court remanded the case with 
instructions that the trial court fully comply with U.C.A. §77-18-l(6)(a). 
Jaeger is directly on point. The defendant pointed out several inaccuracies in the 
presentence investigation report to the trial judge. Unlike Jaeger, however, the trial judge 
never addressed the inaccuracies. Instead, the trial judge simply sentenced the defendant. 
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As in Jaeger, this case should be remanded with instructions that the trial court 
comply with U.C.A. §77-18-l(6)(a). 
POINT III 
TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
WHEN IT FAILED TO REQUEST A CAUTIONARY JURY INSTRUCTION 
REGARDING THE UNRELIABLE NATURE OF CO-DEFENDANTS' 
TESTIMONY, THEREBY DENYING VILLALOBOS OF 
A FAIR TRIAL 
Greg Smith, Villalobos' trial counsel, failed to render effective assistance when 
he neglected to request an appropriate cautionary jury instruction regarding the 
unreliable and not credible nature of co-defendants' testimony implicating Villalobos as 
one of the masked assailants. Screws and Richman had an ulterior motive to testify 
against Villalobos. Had they not agreed to do so, they would have faced extended 
prison terms because both were ring leaders in the commission of the crime and both 
brandished deadly weapons and in fact harmed an alleged victim as a result. In order 
to profit from the State's promise to recommend probation only, Screws and Richman 
had to implicate someone. The outcome of this case hinged upon credibility -
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specifically upon the credibility of two dangerous criminals who had to produce another 
defendant for the State to prosecute. 
In State v. Maestas, 984 P.2d 376, 380-381 (UT 1999), the Court held that when 
the only defense available to the defendant was the unreliability of eyewitness 
identification, trial counsel's failure to request a cautionary instruction seriously 
undermined the fairness of trial and rendered counsel's assistance constitutionally 
ineffective. This case is applicable to the facts presented here. Villalobos' only 
defense was to show that Screws and Richman's testimony was not credible, yet there 
was no jury instruction about properly weighing the sufficiency of the evidence in this 
regard. 
The co-defendants in this case had selfish motives to testify against Villalobos 
and thus a clear conflict of interest. Their testimony was unduly prejudicial to 
Villalobos, unreliable, and not credible. Nonetheless, it was the only evidence 
implicating Villalobos because no one else could identify him or place him at the scene 
of the alleged crime. Villalobos was deprived of his right to a fair trial and ultimately 
of his liberty based on unreliable, not credible, and prejudicial testimony. Villalobos' 
attorney failed to protect Villalobos' right to a fair trial when he neglected to have the 
jury instructed accordingly. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
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Based upon the foregoing arguments, Villalobos respectfully requests this Court 
to vacate his conviction and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of February, 2001. 
Nelson Abbott 
Counsel for Marco Villalobos 
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